Proceedings of the 53rd Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences | 2020

Knowledge Sharing Network in a Community of Illicit Practice: A
Cybermarket Subreddit Case
K. Hazel Kwon
Arizona State University
khkwon@asu.edu
Chun Shao
Arizona State University
cshao9@asu.edu

Weiwen Yu
Arizona State University
weiwenyu@asu.edu
Kailey Broussard
Arizona State University
kcbrouss@asu.edu

Abstract
Often neglected in the literature about communities
of practice is the fact that online knowledge-sharing
communities thrive among illicit collectives whose
activities are stigmatized or outlawed. This paper
focuses on a knowledge-sharing community of users
who engage in illegal practices by examining the ways
in which the community’s network structure changes
when a high-stakes, uncertain event—the July 2017
shutdown of the dark web market Alphabay—occurs.
This study compares the discussion network structures
in the subreddit r/AlphaBay during pre-shutdown days
(the “routine” period) and shutdown days (the
“market defect” period) and offers a content analysis
of the knowledge and resources shared by users during
these periods. Several differences were observed: (a)
the network structure changed such that the network
size grew while becoming more centralized; (b) new
crisis-specific players emerged; (c) types of knowledge
shared during the market defect period was
qualitatively different from the routine period.

1. Introduction
Knowledge
sharing
communities
are
commonplace in digital spaces. Decades of literature
has explored motivations for and effectiveness of
knowledge collaboration online in various contexts
such as business [1, 2], distributed software
development [3—5] and e-learning [6—8].
Studies on virtual knowledge sharing have largely
centered around the notion of “communities of
practice,” an informal group of people who share
knowledge, resources, and meaning, and collectively
learn how to solve problems or do the work better [9].
Most studies of knowledge collaboration examine
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online communities of lawful practices. Often
neglected is the fact that online knowledge sharing
communities exist, and thrive, for illicit collectives
whose activities are stigmatized or outlawed [10].
Illicit knowledge sharing communities are mostly
hosted in a hidden side of the digital world: the dark
web, a collection of websites and web services that are
accessible only through an anonymizing browser (e.g.,
Tor) or special routing software (e.g., I2P). Not all
activities in the dark web are harmful. In fact, some
dark web activity helps expand civil liberties,
challenging an institutionalized, governmental, or
otherwise rigid notion of “legitimacy” [11]. The dark
web often serves as the most secure channel for free
speech, offering space for journalists, whistleblowers,
and political dissidents who challenge repressive
regimes [12, 13].
Nonetheless, much dark web activity is dedicated
to transactions involving illegal products (e.g., drugs
and weapons), cybercrimes (e.g., malware and cyberfrauds), and the circulation of harmful content (e.g.,
child pornography). The ecology of communities of
illicit practices is complicated by the fact that some
dark web-related content is visible in the surface web
(e.g., subreddits, news aggregator sites). However,
information exchanges that occur within communities
of illicit practices almost always use anonymization
technologies to conceal identities, regardless of
whether the community operates only in the darknet or
is visible in both the dark and surface web.
This paper focuses on knowledge sharing
communities of dark web users who engage in illegal
economic practices. Specifically, we define a cyberunderground market community as a self-organized
community of practice and examine the ways in which
the community’s knowledge sharing network structure
changes when a high-stakes, uncertain event occurs.
Illegal markets have been one of the most troubling
cybersecurity issues concerned with dark web
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activities, and thus worth the empirical attention. The
empirical case of interest is the subreddit community
r/AlphaBay, which was dedicated to discussing a
cryptomarket called AlphaBay. AlphaBay, which
became the biggest cyber-underground market,
operated from December 2014 until July 2017, when it
was compromised and permanently shut down by law
enforcement [14]. This study compares the discussion
network structures in r/AlphaBay during pre-shutdown
days (the “routine” period) and shutdown days (the
“market defect” period). This study also offers a
content analysis of the types of knowledge and
resources that were shared by users during these
periods and how members’ communicative activities
differed during the two periods.

2. Illicit Cybermarket Communities in the
Dark Web
The existence of cryptomarkets in hidden parts of
the web has become widely known to the public since
the seizure of the infamous cyber-underground
marketplace SilkRoad by the Federal Bureau of
Investigation in October 2013. Research has found that
illicit drugs comprise the most common products
exchanged in cryptomarkets, followed by stolen data
[15, 16]. AlphaBay was no exception: A vast portion of
online discussions about the AlphaBay market alluded
to illegal drugs.
Virtual information sharing to assist drug
transactions is arguably older than the Internet.
Stanford University and MIT students struck a deal
regarding a marijuana sale in the early 1970s through
the ARPANET, the Internet’s predecessor [17]. In the
1980s and 1990s, a forum known as alt.drugs existed
in Usenet for drug-related discussions [17]. Early cyber
drug markets such as AdamFlowers were based on
encrypted email accounts and relied on monetary
transactions via Western Union, Paypal, Pecunix, IGolder and cash [18].
Illicit market transactions in the early days were
sometimes traceable, making it was easier for law
enforcement to detect the involved actors [18]. The rise
of anonymizing technologies such as Tor, Virtual
Private Network (VPN), and cryptocurrency enhanced
the security of transactions, contributing to the
expansion of the illicit digital economy. As of April
2019, 11 retail markets and seven vendor shops were
listed
as
English-based
marketplaces
on
deepdotweb.com, one of the main news sites for dark
web market users. Although the status of those
marketplaces may fluctuate (e.g., being offline, online,
or temporarily unavailable), they are active markets.
While drugs are the most common products in these

markets, other commodities such as weapons, illegal
services, hacked data, and malware are also sold.
If marketplaces are one pillar of the cyberunderground economy, the other pillar is discussion
forums [19]. Given the instability of market platforms,
the sustainability of the cyber-underground economy
depends on timely information sharing among market
members to help assess vendor and platform credibility
and security updates. Beyond the whole market being
compromised, even a single individual’s identity
breach can increase the collective risk. Therefore,
community members tend to be proactive with respect
to sharing knowledge about identity concealment
strategies, called OPSEC [20—22]. Vendors and users
often maintain the same screen name across different
marketplaces and forums as a trust-building
mechanism [19]. Participation in discussion forums
helps contributors advertise products, demonstrate
expertise, and gain visibility as reliable informants. A
positive reputation established in discussion forums
can function as social capital [23] that may translate
into higher economic returns.

3. Illicit Cybermarket Communities as
Self-Organized Communities of Practice
Considering the role online forums play in the illicit
cybermarket ecology, an examination of the network
structures in these forums may help explain how
cybermarket users engage in knowledge sharing to
pursue their collective interests. Accordingly, we
propose to conceptualize illicit cybermarket forums as
self-organized communities of practice.
The characteristics of illicit market forums fit
incredibly well the definition of communities of
practice. Communities of practice are defined as
“groups of people informally bound together by shared
expertise and passion for a joint enterprise” [24, p.
139]. Communities of practice have become an integral
part of organizational systems that require some level
of collective knowledge management, including
business, government, education, and social sectors
[25]. Online networks help create decentralized
communities of practice that are larger scope and size.
The ways in which hidden cyber-collectives exploit
digital platforms are commensurate with essential
features of communities of practices [24, 25].

3.1. Purposiveness
A community of practice “is defined by a shared
domain of interest” [25, p.1]. The illicit market actors
share a clearly defined agenda: to engage in economic
activities that are stigmatized or outlawed by legitimate
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institutions. Due to the nature of illegitimacy, members
also share another problem: OPSEC. Specifically, the
interests in OPSEC have evolved at two levels. At the
“system level,” market platforms are vulnerable to the
risks of hacking, theft, and infiltration by law
enforcement; at the “process level,” vendors can
deceive buyers (e.g., not shipping a promised product)
[15].

3.2. Practice
A community of practice is where members learn
about “becoming a practitioner, not learning about
practice” [26, p.48, italics original]. Therefore, the
process of knowledge sharing in communities of
practice is oriented toward pragmatic, experiential
learning. The illicit market forum members have a
shared goal of becoming a “successful” practitioner:
buying or selling drugs without being busted. The
primary aim of the forums, therefore, is to document
and exchange technical and practical knowledge
needed to securely participate in high-stakes activities.
Other motives such as punditry, leisure, or
socialization may be observed but they are auxiliary
drivers of social interactions in these forums.

3.3. Knowledge
Interactions

Embedded

in

Social

Learning is the main function of communities of
practices [9]. Unlike formal training or structured
teaching, knowledge is gained through informal social
interactions in which not only “objective” knowledge
but also, and more importantly, “insider” know-how is
embedded [26, p.48]. Learning in communities of
practice thus translates to internalizing the culture of
collectives such as viewpoints, vernaculars, and
behavioral rules [26].
The dark web market forums are where market
users with different levels of experience get together to
share with and learn from peers’ knowledge and
experiences. While some forums include wellformatted technical tutorials on how to use markets, the
largest portion of communicative activities observed in
these forums is in the form of real-time questions and
answers [20]. Novices seek tips and advice;
experienced users share previous experiences, which in
turn constitute a collective narrative of the dark web
market history; the involved members share up-to-date
information about markets’ status and share vendor
reviews. Such learning occurs in the midst of informal
discursive interactions.

3.4. Self-selection

A community of practice is not a formal
organization. Unlike project group assignments or
organizational divisions, members voluntarily choose
to be a part of the community [24]. Individual
members’ positions in the community are thus
determined not hierarchically but based on the level of
time and effort they spend in the community at their
own will.
Such informality and meritocracy are defining
characteristics of dark web market forums [20].
Whereas actual marketplaces are run by more or less
canonical rules (e.g., imposing mechanisms of social
control and administrative authority to ban certain
vendors and buyers), most discussion forums are run as
an open, self-regulated network of voluntary members.
The level of expertise, experience, or technical
sophistication are not criteria for membership, although
there is an implicit expectation that a user should
achieve some level of expertise through both informal
learning in forums as well as actual engagement in
market activities to become a true member of the
community.

3.5. Self-organized Knowledge Collaboration
Based on informal social interactions and selfselective membership, communities of practice can be
understood as a self-organized knowledge sharing
system. An essential characteristic of a virtual selforganizing system is its fluidity [27]. A fluid
organizing system lacks traditional structural
mechanisms such that organizational positions, roles,
and boundaries are loosely defined [27]. Instead,
fluidity allows “highly flexible and permeable
boundaries” of communities, making it difficult “to
figure out who is in the community and who is outside
at any point in time, let alone over time” [p.1226].
Furthermore, the dynamics of knowledge collaboration
do not rely on predefined role structures or adhesive
“people-to-people relations” [p.1235]. Rather, the
collaborative network changes its configuration
constantly based on the flow of ideas, external
conditions, and the nature of problems that the
community collectively encounters. Scholarship has
referred to such organizational flexibility for
knowledge collaboration as “emergent network” [28—
30] or “generative response” [27].
The dark web market forms are a space for fluid
collectives in that there is no strict protocol to enter
and exit, insofar as a user has a basic ability to get
access to it anonymously. Although administrators may
moderate community interactions to some extent, the
community does not impose a formal hierarchy.
Anonymous social interactions make the community
even more permeable because members’ real identities
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are concealed from one another and thus social
interactions are assumed to be inherently temporary
and transitory [31].
In sum, as a self-organized system, knowledge
sharing dynamics in illicit market forums can be highly
adaptive to the nature of problems, level of uncertainty,
and who has what types of knowledge at a given
moment. Given that few studies have examined the
emergence of knowledge sharing networks in the dark
web market forums, the current study attempts to
contribute to understanding the self-organizing aspect
of these communities.

4. Empirical Context and Research
Questions
This study presents a case of the cryptomarket
called AlphaBay. AlphaBay was shut down in July
2017. Initially suspected as an exit scam (i.e., a fraud
by the market administrators), it later turned out that
the shutdown was caused by an international law
enforcement team comprised of the U.S., Canada, and
Thailand. On July 15, 2015, Alexandre Cazes, a cofounder of the market who was arrested on the same
day as the shutdown, was found dead in jail in
Thailand. AlphaBay was the largest cyber-underground
market to emerge since the shutdown of the legendary
market SilkRoad, with $600,000 to $800,000 in daily
revenue.
Several major forums served as communities of
practices for AlphaBay users, including AlphaBayfrm
(an AlphaBay market-specific forum hosted in Tor),
The Hub (a multi-market forum hosted in Tor), and
several subreddits on Reddit.com. This paper focuses
on one of the subreddit communities, r/AlphaBay.
This paper is particularly interested in the
emergent network structure of the illicit market forum.
As a self-organized knowledge sharing collective, the
community dynamics may reveal fluid knowledge
flows depending on the types of problems that users
collectively face. Specifically, in ordinary times, the
problems users encounter may be more routinized,
centered around vendor credibility and procedural
issues related to access, transactions, and shipping.
However, when a system-level defect in the market
platform is abruptly experienced, the non-routine
situation may pose more severe collective risks with a
higher level of uncertainty. Facing a non-routine,
highly uncertain event could change the interaction
dynamics.
We contend that such change should be manifest
in two forms: (a) We anticipate changes in
communication network structures. According to
communication network evolution perspective, a crisis

event plays a role in changing the structure of
computer-mediated communication networks. For
example, a study of an inter-organizational email
network showed that both communication volumes and
number of communicators have increased when
members faced an organizational uncertainty. Also, the
network tends to form a giant component rather than
being fragmented into subgroups [32]. More recently,
Twitter research in the context of natural disaster
(Japanese earthquake and Tsunami) found that affected
users (i.e., Japanese users) intensified their degree of
interactions than non-affected users (i.e., nonJapanese). Such interactions, however, have increased
among the existing users, with less activity of newly
joining or quitting a community [33]. (b) Along with
network change, the nature of communicative content
shared among members may also change. For example,
prior research has shown that, along with the average
length of individual messages being shortened,
conversations became less diverse and more
concentrated toward problem-solving [32, 33]. Also,
decentralized problem-solving efforts and concerns
about safety and wellness of community members
became prominent in the electronic messages
exchanged during the crisis period [34]. While
existing studies were based on legitimate communities
or organizational networks, little is known whether
illicit, hidden cyber communities will exhibit similar
patterns in network changes and communication
contents when they face a highly uncertain situation.
As a preliminary study, this paper posits two research
questions.
RQ1: How does the structure of the knowledge
sharing network change in an illicit market forum
when the community collectively experiences a critical
market defect?
RQ2: How do communicative activities change in
an illicit market forum when the community
collectively experiences a critical market defect?

5. Methods
5.1. Data Collection
The subreddit data (r/AlphaBay) was provided by
a cybersecurity firm that has partnered with the
university where the authors are affiliated (Company
name will be identified upon the paper acceptance).
Whereas mainstream media reported that AlphaBay
was seized on a specific day (July 4, 2017), the market
users’ experience was not a one-day event. Instead,
users experienced errors and irregularities for multiple
days around the time of the seizure. To identify the
timespan of the market defect more precisely, we
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adopted a previous study’s method that was used to
detect the anomaly period in social media activities
[35].
Specifically, we first examined the longitudinal
pattern of daily posting volumes over a year, from June
2016 to July 2017. The daily average of total posting
was 48.48 posts a day (SD=62.34) and the daily
average number of newly created topic threads was
6.03 (SD=5.73). Second, we used the number of newly
created topic threads as a criterion to identify the
anomaly in activity volumes. We used the topic threads
instead of total post activities because it is possible that
a certain old topic could continue to draw
conversations over time regardless of the shutdown
event. Beginning a new discussion thread, however,
may be more reflective of what is happening at a given
moment. Next, we defined days were considered part
of the anomaly period if a daily number of newly
created topic threads exceeded two standard deviations
from the mean (=17.50). Lastly, we reviewed the actual
posts made during the identified anomaly days to
understand what had happened and whether the
happening was indeed related to a non-routine problem
with a high level of uncertainty.
From the procedure above, we identified two
abnormal periods, one in December 2016 and another
in July 2017. The review of the posts suggested that the
market was offline temporarily on December 13 and
14, 2016; and the market defect, which eventually was
linked to the permanent shutdown, was experienced for
about 10 days from July 5 to July 14, 2017 (Figure 1).
This study focuses on the identified ten days of the
market defect in July 2017. The total number of topic
threads that were created during the market defect
period was 346, and the total number of posts was
1,587. For comparison, we also examined a similar
number of topic threads and posts made prior to the
beginning of the market defect period, which spanned
from May 19, 2017, to July 4, 2017. We defined this
time window as a “routine period,” which included the
creation of 383 topic threads and 1,663 posts. As a
result, a total of 3,250 posts were analyzed.

sociometric matrix based on co-postings in the same
topic threads (Figure 2a and 2b).

Figure 1. Daily creation of topic threads
between June 2016 and July 2017. Red
markers are the days with a sudden increase
in volume (> 17.5).

Figure 2a. An example of transforming a twomode (user-by-thread, directional) matrix to
the corresponding one-mode (user-by-user,
nondirectional) network. Diagonal values (blue
cells) in the one-mode matrix indicate each
user’s total posting frequency.

5.2. Network Analysis
Network analysis requires two sets of variables:
nodes and edges. In this study, nodes are anonymous
users involved in discursive activities in the examined
subreddit forum. Edges are defined as non-directional
ties that represent co-posting behaviors. The default
format of the network data was a two-mode (user-bythread) matrix that informs which users contributed to
which topic threads. The default format was
transformed into a one-mode (user-by-user)

Figure 2b. Sociograms of two-mode network
vs. one-mode network based on the
sociometric data exemplified in Figure 2a.
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The co-posting matrix is more useful in this study
than the original user-by-thread matrix because it
allows for examining who were exposed to whose
ideas/knowledge as well as who were the most active
contributors across different topics.
That said, the transformation of a two-mode
network into a one-mode network loses one important
property of the data: the absolute total number of posts
that a user contributed. For example, suppose users i
and j contributed one post to the same thread A. The
co-posting-based edge weight between user i and j
would be 1 (Eij=1). If user i made three posts across
three different topic threads A, B, and C, and user j
also made three posts across the three same threads A,
B, and C, the edge weight between i and j would be 3
(Eij=3). However, if user i made three posts across
threads A, B, and C, while user j also made three posts
yet only in thread A, the co-posting-based edge weight
between i and j will be just 1 (Eij=1) even if user j’s
total number of posts was 3. Furthermore, suppose user
i made three posts across threads A, B, and C, whereas
user j made three posts across D, E, and F. In this case,
their co-posting-based edge weight will score zero
(Eij=0) irrespective of how many contributions each
user has made.
Considering that the one-mode transformation
engendered the loss of the total posting information,
we created a node attribute that indicates the total
number of posts a user contributed across all topic
threads during each period (i.e., routine and market
defect period). As presented in a later section, we used
both co-posting-based degree centrality and the total
post frequency as key performance indicators (KPI).

5.3. Content Analysis
Considering that an essential goal of communities
of practice is knowledge sharing for problem-solving,
we analyzed whether a post contains strategic
assessment that helps improve the situation or solve
problems. Organizational uncertainty management
literature suggests that group members reduce
uncertainty in two ways. First, they collectively make
sense of the status of the situation (e.g., how likely the
concerned outcome is to occur or how severe the
outcome would be) [33]. The group information
processing perspective [34] defines such type of
uncertainty management as “closure,” which refers to
reaching a conclusion of how to define the state of the
situation. Second, community members manage the
uncertainty by sharing specific resources and
knowledge that help identify what actions should be
taken to appropriately respond to the situation or
problems [33].

Based on the literature, a post was defined as
containing a strategic assessment if the message had a
conclusive statement that definitively diagnosed the
situation or if the user suggested actionable item(s) to
resolve or improve the situation or problems. About
10% of the posts were analyzed for intercoder
reliability, reaching 90.23% agreement and a Cohen’s
Kappa coefficient of .685, suggesting substantial
agreement.

6. Results
6.1. Network Structure Overview
The number of posts included for the market defect
period (=1,587) was less than the routine period
(=1,663). Nonetheless, the co-posting network analysis
revealed that more users and more co-posting edges
were included in the market defect period than the
routine period. Specifically, 709 users created 24,320
co-posting ties during the market defect period,
whereas 592 users created 6,296 ties during the routine
period. The large number of co-posting ties also
resulted in higher average degree centrality (weighted)
during the market defect period (=36.181) than the
routine period (=11.196)
Conventionally, a network tends to have a lower
density as its size grows because density is computed
against the total number of all possible edges. This was
not the case in this study, however. Even if there were
more users involved in discussions during the market
defect period, the co-posting activities were so
extensive that the network density (=.048) was also
noticeably higher than the routine period (=.018).
Along with density, other structural characteristics
similarly suggested that the market defect period
showed more concentrated and centralized knowledge
sharing patterns than the routine period, including a
shorter network diameter and shorter average path
length, and a larger clustering coefficient and larger
centralization coefficient. Table 1 compares the
network structural characteristics between the routine
and market defect period. Also, Figure 3a and 3b
visualize the co-posting network structure configured
in each period.
Table 1. Co-posting network analysis results.
Network properties

Routine

Market
Defect

# of posts included

1663

1587

# of nodes

592

709
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# of edges

6296

24320

11.196

36.181

9

7

Graph density

.018

.048

Avg. clustering coefficient

.797

.826

Avg. path length

3.492

2.771

Centralization (degree)

.236

.474

Avg. degree (weighted)
Network diameter

6.1. Key Players Identification
Degree centrality and total posting frequency were
used as KPIs to identify “key players” in each time
period. Specifically, we first selected the top 10% of
users based on the degree centrality during the routine
and market defect period, respectively. Then we
selected another top 10% of users based on the posting
frequency during each time period. Some users had
both high degree centrality and posting frequency and
thus were selected repeatedly. As a result of using both
KPIs, we identified a total of 174 key players. Eighteen
(10%) of these key players appeared in both routine
and market defect periods, 64 (37%) were associated
only with the routine period, and 92 (53%) uniquely
emerged during the market defect period. In other
words, those who emerged as active participants during
the market defect period were different users from
those active during the routine period.

Figure 3a. Co-posting network during the
market defect period. Some peripheral nodes
were removed from the visualization. Nodes
are colored based on degree centrality, with
red ( >=150), blue (100-149), green (50-99), and
yellow (< 50).

6.2. Knowledge
Assessment

Sharing

for

Strategic

The content analysis resulted in 356 posts that
contained strategic assessment during the routine
period (21.4% out of 1663 posts) and 369 posts during
the market defect period (23.25% out of 1587 posts).
Although key players constituted only a small fraction
of users engaged in each period, they were incredibly
active in sharing strategic knowledge in both periods,
accounting for 55% (post N=198) of the total strategic
knowledge sharing during the routine period and 57%
(post N=210) during the market defect. The rest of
strategic knowledge sharing was contributed by nonkey players (Table 2 and Figure 4).
Table 2. Strategic assessment posts made by
key players (KP) and non-key players.
Routine

Figure 3a. Co-posting network during the
routine period. Nodes are colored based on
degree centrality, with red (>= 150), blue (100149), green (50-99), and yellow (< 50).

Market Defect

User N

Post N

User N

Post N

All-time KP

18

44
(12%)

18

49
(13%)

Periodspecific KP

64

154
(43%)

92

161
(44%)

Non KP

510

158
(45%)

599

159
(43%)

Total

592

346
(100%)

709

369
(100%)
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The distribution of strategic knowledge sharing
across the three user types—all-time key players,
period-specific key players, and non-key players —
were similar between the two time periods. In other
words, the proportion of contributions from each group
was consistent between the routine and market defect
period.
However, when the actual messages were reviewed,
the nature of shared knowledge was distinctive
between the two time periods. Specifically, during the
routine period, the strategic knowledge sharing was
centered around (a) how to use AlphaBay securely,
e.g., “if you are using ab without a vpn then your isp
already knows what you’re doing. If you have a vpn
then net neutrality elimination shouldn’t be a
significant problem”1; (b) information related to
shipping and transactions, e.g., “paper is a hard thing
to find among thousands of other packs of paper.” 2;
and (c) vendor information, e.g., “if you don’t mind
international then gammagoblin with over 250$ spent
gets tracked so you have that safety.”
Meanwhile, during the market defect period, the
attempt for closure was made by concluding
Alphabay’s shutdown was an exit scam, e.g., “... it's
looking more and more like they've fucked us. for me i
lost quite a bit mid purchase. but nowhere near as
much as some people.. if they stay down it'll ruin lives.
be nice. help find vendors. do what you can because
some people might have really fucked up.” It was only
after July 12 when the correct conclusion was reached
that the shutdown was caused by law enforcement,
e.g., “Alphabay taken down by law enforcement across
3 countries...lol...yes. It was official yesterday really.
There is no hope for alpha whatsoever.” Another
chunk of strategic assessment in this period related to
alternative markets or routes for transactions, e.g.,
“Hansa [market] is so much safer. You are probably a
vendor which is why you are supporting Dream
market.”
In both routine and market defect periods, securityrelated discussions such as the importance of VPN,
encryption, and running the privacy program Tails with
a virtual machine, recurred consistently, e.g. “the
biggest silver lining with alphabay going away is now
you get a nice reset on your opsec…i’ll send it
unencrypted and just trust this handy little checkbox to
do the hard work for me? at least those unencrypted
messages are likely no longer a risk as le will
probably...move on as well like us to the next active
market.”3
1
2
3

ab = AlphaBay; isp = Internet Service Provider.
paper = an ingestible form of drug tablet
le = law enforcement

Figure 4. Percentage contribution of strategic
knowledge sharing by types of users during
routine vs. market defect period.

7. Conclusion
The current study investigated a subreddit forum
for cryptomarket market activities on the dark web. We
defined an online community of illicit market users as
a form of community of practice. Although illicit
market communities in the dark web are unique in that
the nature of practice is concealed and illegitimate,
they are ultimately human organizing system. By
examining illicit market communities as self-organized
knowledge-sharing collectives, this paper attempted to
expand the understanding of the communicatively
organizing principles for uncertainty management in
illicit cyber-market system. Our results suggest that,
despite the illicit nature, the collaborative dynamics
and organizing principles were strikingly resonant with
essential characteristics of “normal” communities of
practice.
Particularly, this study focused on the comparison
between routine and market defect periods. Literature
on emergent collaboration networks has suggested that
efficient network structures may vary depending on
whether a task is routine and non-routine [28]. Drawn
from early insights, this study compared the network
structures as well as the content of strategic knowledge
shared in each period.
Findings suggested that, while the distribution of
sheer volume of strategic posts was not much different
between the two periods, several differences were
observed: (a) the network structure changed such that
the network size grew while co-posting patterns were
more centralized; (b) new crisis-specific key players
emerged; (c) types of knowledge shared during the
market defect period was qualitatively different from
the routine period. While the majority of strategic
knowledge was contributed by a small fraction of key
players, the contribution by non-key players, who may
also be defined as “peripheral legitimate participants”
[27, p.1226], was not trivial. Future research is
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recommended to examine how different or similar the
nature of shared knowledge is between different user
types (all-time key players, period-specific key players,
and peripheral legitimate participants). The current
study is one of early work on communication network
evolution in hidden cyber collectives. While the
findings and discussions in this paper are preliminary,
future research may delve further into communication
organizational principles in “normal” online
communities and
virtual
organizations, and
systematically compare how similar or different the
illicit cyber-communities on the dark web are from the
communities in visible digital space.
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